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Foreign Entry Liberalization and Export Quality: 
Evidence from China 
Xinyu Hou; Yingying Shi; Puyang Sun1 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of foreign entry deregulation in China on the export price 
and quality of manufacturing firms through input-output linkage. We create a unique dataset 
describing the extent of regulatory control over foreign entry across approximately 900 industries 
covering all primary, manufacturing and services sectors. Results suggest foreign entry 
deregulation encourages firms to improve product quality and increase export prices. 
Deregulation in the manufacturing sectors has more impact on downstream export price and 
quality, compared with services sectors. Moreover, firms having larger imported inputs benefit 
more from foreign entry deregulation. These effects are robust to alternative specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
Current literature on economic integration often centers on the liberalization of trade in goods 
and services and their impacts on firms’ export performance, especially in developing countries 
(Pavcnik, 2002; Arnold et al., 2011; Bas, 2014; Arnold et al., 2016). However, these studies 
appear to neglect another important trend: the liberalization of across-the-border investment 
flows, especially in the form of direct investment. In the past, developing countries imposed 
many regulations that restricted or prohibited foreign investors from entering domestic markets. 
However, as is witnessed by the signing of a growing number of regional trade agreements, 
investment chapters have become an indispensable component of integration (e.g., Chornyi et al., 
2016). This reflects the increasing importance of liberalization of foreign investment in 
enhancing economic growth (Bas and El-Mallakh, 2019).  
In this paper, we study the impacts of FDI policy change through the input-output 
linkage2. In modern economies, production in manufacturing firms requires many different kinds 
of inputs from other sectors, which constructs very sophisticated input-output structures (Ding 
et al., 2019). This kind of inter-sectoral linkage has been proved to be a very important channel 
for economic shocks or policy reform generating effects (Acemoglu et al., 2006; Di Giovanni et 
al., 2014). That means the influence from economic shocks or policy reform not only happens 
directly but also spills over to other industries through the input linkages. Ignoring the 
across-industry effect generated by the input-output linkage misses an important impact of 
economic reform. For manufacturing firms, with strict regulation in the input sectors, they have 
to pay higher costs to purchase inputs. This reduces the incentive for production improvement. 
When there is liberalization in the input sectors, manufacturing producers benefit because of 
reduced production costs (Bourles et al., 2013; Fan et al., 2019). Existing studies often apply this 
input and output approach to study the indirect effect of trade liberalization on downstream 
firms’ performances, mostly on productivity enhancement (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Gopinath 
and Neiman, 2014; Bas et al., 2016), on expanded product scope (Goldberg et al., 2010) and on 
quality upgrading (Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015; Fan et al., 2015a). Some other studies apply this 
approach to investigate the effect of service deregulation on manufacturing firm’s growth 
(Fernandes, 2009), on manufacturing firms’ total factor productivity or multi-factor productivity 
growth (Fernandes and Paunov, 2012; Bourles et al., 2013; Bas and Causa, 2013; Beverelli et al., 
2017) and on manufacturing firms’ export performance (Bas, 2014). However, the effect of 
                                                            
2
 The input-output linkage relies on the input-output table, which is frequently used in the existing literature (Amiti 
and Konings, 2007; Goldberg et al., 2010; Gopinath and Neiman, 2014; Bas et al., 2016; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015; 
Fan et al., 2015a). If industry A’s output is used as an input for industry B’s production in the input-output table, we 
define the industry A as the upstream sector or input sector for firms in industry B. 
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foreign investment liberalization through input-output linkages is less known in the existing 
literature. 
In order to fill this gap, this paper offers a theoretical model to characterize a new source 
of gains from FDI deregulation: vertical linkages and examines empirically the extent of the 
impact of FDI deregulation on export price and quality using Chinese firm-level data from 2000 
to 2007. Even though there are some recent literatures studying the impact of policy changes 
through vertical linkages, this paper is the first to study the relationship between upstream FDI 
deregulation and export quality. Quality upgrading is regarded as a prerequisite for export 
success and economic development (Fan et al., 2015a). Recent literature has shown that 
within-industry FDI entry has a large impact on export quality (e.g. Faruq, 2010; Harding and 
Jarvocik, 2012; Zhu and Fu, 2013; Amighini and Sanfilippo, 2014; Anwar and Sun, 2018). None 
of these studies have examined the across-industry effect of FDI liberalization policy yet. 
Relaxation of foreign regulatory control allows more foreign controlled firms to enter and apply 
advanced technologies in the production process. FDI entry deregulation brings about a decrease 
on marginal cost and fixed cost for intermediated goods production3. Thus, FDI deregulation 
can lead to more supplies of intermediated goods at a lower price in the input market. For 
manufacturing firms, access to more varieties of inputs at lower cost caused by the liberalization 
of FDI regulation will decrease the cost of producing higher quality products and enhance 
export quality. Furthermore, higher quality products increase product demand. The increasing 
demand for the export products leads to higher prices.  
Our paper also contributes to the current literature in two other ways. First, we offer 
another explanation to the quality upgrading of exports – FDI deregulations in input sectors, 
which has not been studied in the existing literature. Second, we create a rich dataset of upstream 
foreign entry regulation faced by manufacturing firms in China based on the official document: 
the “Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment”. In this way, we can track 
policy changes faced by the manufacturing firms in various versions of the Catalogue.  
In the empirical part, we focus on China’s FDI policy reform from the late 1990s, when 
foreign entry reform became an integral part of China’s reform and opening-up policy. China 
presents as a good case to study the impact of cross-border investment flows. Since the early 
1980s, foreign direct investment has been flowing to China to an unprecedented level. For this 
reason, we focus on China’s FDI policy reform in this paper, which may have extended 
implications for other developing countries. We provide evidence that reduction in foreign entry 
                                                            
3
 This setting is similar with Bas and El-Mallakh (2019). What is different is that we investigated the export quality 
and export price effect of upstream FDI liberalization, but Bas and El-Mallakh (2019) investigated the technology 
choice effect. 
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regulation from input sector increases manufacturing firms’ export quality and price. This 
positive effect is larger for firms with more imported inputs.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our general theoretical 
framework. Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of China’s foreign entry liberalization. 
Section 4 describes our empirical approach and discusses relevant data. Section 5 delineates our 
primary results and results from robustness checks. Section 6 is a conclusion. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
We build a simple model to describe how foreign deregulation affects manufacturing firms’ 
export quality and export price through intermediate input linkage.  
2.1 Consumer Preferences and Demand 
We assume the preferences of the consumers for the export market to be as follows:          
                        (1) 
     Here  is the quality of product ω，and  is the demand for product ω.  
refers to the elasticity of substitution among products.  and measures the variance of 
product quality. The larger the value, the greater difference there is in product quality.  is the 
set of product variety. Based on these assumptions, when total expenditure is E, demand for 
product ω is thus: 
                      (2) 
     Here  is the CES price index and is exogenous to each individual firm’s decision. 
 is the price of product ω produced by the firm. 
2.2 Foreign Entry Regulation and the Production of Intermediate Goods 
For a manufacturing firm to produce an export product, it needs to combine a number of 
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elasticity of substitution among inputs4. Manufacturing firms purchase inputs in the intermediate 
goods market. The market structure of the intermediate goods is monopolistic competition as in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Assume it requires only one input, labor, to produce each variety of 
input j. Labor is perfectly mobile across sectors in the economy and labor supply is perfectly 
inelastic. Further we assume there is fixed amount of labor for production of intermediate 
goods in the economy.  
     The production function of each intermediate good j is: 
                         (3) 
Here  represents the amount of labor needed to produce 
 
amount of intermediate good j.
 is the fixed cost to produce intermediate good j.  is the marginal cost to produce 
intermediate good j.  is the degree of foreign entry regulatory control. The larger  is, the 
stricter the regulatory control. Relaxation of foreign regulatory control allows more foreign 
controlled firms to enter into the intermediate goods market and apply advanced technologies in 
the production of inputs. Therefore, when foreign entry regulatory control relaxes, fixed costs 
and the marginal costs of production reduce. Therefore,
 
 and . 
     The profit function for producing intermediate good j is: 
                   (4) 
where  is the wage rate. From profit maximization, we can get the price of intermediate good 
j is . In the meantime, with the free entry and exit condition, the profit for 
producing input j is 0. Therefore, we can get the equilibrium output level of each input j as: 
                          (5) 
     In equilibrium, the amount of labor to produce input j is . The number of 
intermediate goods varieties is: 
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 Following the approach by Puga and Venables (1997) and Bas and El-Mallakh (2019), we assumed that elasticity 
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                            (6) 
2.3 Determination of Manufacturing Firms’ Export Product Quality and Price  
Assume the technology for producing good ω is φ. We omit ω for simplification and the 
subsequent analysis refers to a manufacturing firm producing good ω. The export production 
function can be expressed as follows.  
                         (7) 
Y refers to output of product ω. L is labor inputs.  refers to the relative importance of 
inputs in the production process. . . This shows that, when output 
remains fixed, the firm requires more intermediate inputs to produce high-quality as opposed to 
low-quality products.
 
is the intermediate inputs, which connect intermediate 
goods we describe in Section 2.2 and the export product. Based on these assumptions, the total 
cost function to produce good ω can be written as follows:          
                           (8) 
Using the cost minimization procedure, we can identify the marginal cost function of the 
firm as follows (for details, please refer to Appendix A.1): 
                         (9) 
After finishing purchasing intermediate goods, the firm starts to produce the final product 
and decides on the quality level of the product. The specific profit function of the firm can be 
expressed as: 
                           (10) 
where z represents product demand as in Equation (2). MC refers to the marginal cost of 
production as in Equation (9). p refers to the price of the final export product, q refers to the 
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export product quality level, and f is associated costs with export product quality. The higher 
quality is associated with the higher fixed cost of production. Here parameter  refers to 
the part of costs increased due to product quality enhancement and is determined by the nature 
of the product. We assume  so that there is no corner solution, and the 
resulting product quality is strictly positive and finite. In addition,  refers to the iceberg 
costs that the firm needs to pay for exporting the final product. F refers to the fixed costs that 
the firm needs to pay to export the product.   
  Combining with the definition of  as well as 
( )
J
j
L
N
f rσ
= , after solving 
the profit maximum problem shown as equation (10), we find that export product quality and 
price satisfy the following conditions (proof refers to Appendix A.2):  
       (11) 
    (12) 
2.4 Changes in Foreign Entry Regulation and the Manufacturing Firm’s Export Quality 
We can derive the partial derivative with respect to the level of foreign entry regulatory control r 
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firms’ export product will be improved through the channel of intermediate goods. That is 
because reduction in foreign entry regulation increases the varieties of intermediate goods used 
by manufacturing firms and decreases the price of every intermediate good, which leads to the 
reduction the cost of improving export quality. Therefore, the manufacturing firms would 
choose to raise export quality when faced with foreign entry deregulation from input sectors. 
Meanwhile, when ， ， ,  and , the 
export price will increase with the relaxation of foreign entry regulatory control of intermediate 
goods sectors, ln 0p r∂ ∂ < . This is because the increasing demand for the export product 
caused by higher quality leads to a higher price. Based on the analysis, we can get the following 
proposition: 
Relaxation of foreign entry regulatory control will enhance quality and increase the prices of 
export products through intermediate good input linkage.5 
3. Foreign Entry Liberalization in China 
Since the reform and opening up of China during the early 1980s, the country has included the 
encouragement of FDI in its opening-up policy. Attracting FDI was regarded as an important 
means to cover firms’ financing gap, promote exports, and transmit advanced technology and 
capacity during the initial period. FDI in China arose in the form of joint ventures, cooperative 
enterprises, and solely foreign-owned enterprises. However, during the initial period, joint 
ventures were the major form of FDI, because solely foreign owned enterprises were not 
allowed unless they adopted advanced technology or exported a majority of their products. 
Various economic zones were created, and foreign direct investment was given special treatment 
in terms of tax rebates and subsidies. As a result, China has become the largest FDI recipient 
among developing countries since the year 1993. 
As the flow of FDI in China grew over the years, the objective of attracting FDI has 
gradually shifted from merely encouraging quantities of FDI to filling the funding gaps, 
improving the quality of FDI, and meeting the demand of internal economic development. 
                                                            
5
 For example, in the real-world scenario, the intermediate good sectors for mobile phone include steel, chips, 
camera, screen, and battery. If foreign entry regulation relaxes, foreign companies would be allowed to enter and 
bring advanced production technologies. The production cost of intermediate goods would reduce and new inputs 
would begin to enter into the input market. As a result, the mobile phone exporters can produce higher quality 
mobile phones with access to new and cheaper inputs (i.e. harder cover, faster chips, advanced camera, higher 
definition screen) in the input sector. Foreign consumers may prefer mobile phones with higher quality. This means 
foreign consumers are willing to pay a higher price for mobile phones with higher quality. As a result, foreign entry 
deregulation leads to higher export quality and export of mobile phones’ manufacturers through inputs linkages.  
( ) 0jf r r∂ ∂ > ( ) 0c r r∂ ∂ > ( 1) 0β η α σ> − − > 1σ > β η<
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Meanwhile, China further liberalized FDI entry in the service subsectors, such as in finance, 
insurance, transportation, and medical services. In order to meet the membership requirements 
of the WTO, in 2001, China removed restrictions and encouraged the inflow of FDI in the form 
of solely foreign-owned enterprises to boost technology adoption and export expansion. Within 
a year of entry into the WTO, China further removed FDI requirements such as export 
proportion, local contents, balance of foreign exchanges, technology transfer, and the creation of 
R&D centers. As a result, China is now the second largest FDI recipient country in the world 
according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
Along with the changing focus of FDI policy in China was the introduction and 
subsequent revisions of the foreign entry regulation. In 1995, the National Development and 
Reform Commission first introduced the “Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign 
Investment” to provide specific guidance for attracting FDI. This regulation has been one of the 
most important laws and regulations governing the inflow of FDI. The Catalogue was 
subsequently revised many times to reflect the changing emphasis of policy objectives regarding 
FDI inflows.  
The Catalogue assigns each industry or sector one of the following labels: “prohibited,” 
“restricted,” and “encouraged.” Any foreign investment project that is not covered in the 
Catalogue is regarded as “allowed.” Regarding sectors that prohibit or restrict FDI, foreigners are 
not allowed or are conditionally allowed to invest in the sector in some situations. Foreigners are 
fully allowed to invest in sectors that are under the “encouraged” category, and the government 
will provide some benefits such as taxation, location choice, and subsidies. Another category that 
specifies “allowed” status indicates that foreigners can invest in the particular sector but without 
policy favors in the form of subsidies or taxation rebates. In general, each revision of the 
Catalogue reflects greater transparency in regulating foreign capital access and greater extent of 
openness to foreign capital.  
In this paper, we have selected the period from 1997 to 2007 as the focus of our study. 
This period of time included the most drastic changes in the FDI policy as China’s economic 
reform has deepened, and the entry of WTO has imposed further requirements for opening up 
for FDI. We match the 350 to 400 items listed in the Catalogue with the Chinese CIC (GB2002) 
industrial codes to arrive at approximately 920 four-digit industries. We are able to gain a 
preliminary idea about the extent of foreign entry liberalization by looking at the number of 
industries under different types of regulation.  
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Figure 1 Overview of Foreign Entry Policy (1997-2007) 
      
Comparing the four revisions of the Catalogue, Figure 1 shows that the number of sectors 
under the encouragement policy has increased from 136 to 225 between 1997 and 2007. While 
there was some initial decline of sectors under prohibition or restriction policies between 1997 
and 2002, the number of prohibited or restricted sectors was on the rise by the year 2007. As 
shown in Figure 2, most of the foreign entry deregulation takes place in the manufacturing sector, 
while there has been only a slight increase in regulation in the services sector.  
Figure 2 Restriction or Prohibition Policies across Major Sectors 
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restrictions in the food and beverage sector and the electronic equipment sector, whereas 
restrictions in the metal sector increased slightly by 2007 (Figure 3).  
Figure 3 Restriction or Prohibition Policy in the Manufacturing Subsectors 
 
Similar to previous findings, Figure 4 shows that restrictions of foreign entry are much 
higher in services at the aggregated level. However, the picture looks different when we break 
down the data into different subsectors. Despite the relatively high level of restrictions in the 
services sector, there has been substantial deregulation in the financial services subsector. The 
transportation and retail and wholesale trade subsectors remain the most highly restricted areas.  
Figure 4 Restriction or Prohibition Policy in the Services Subsectors 
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4. Empirical Approaches and Data 
4.1 Empirical Approach 
The proposition in the illustrative theoretical framework implies that manufacturing firms’ 
export quality and export prices are affected by FDI regulation policy through input-output 
linkages. We investigate the relationship using the following reduced-form equations:  
     1 2 3 4ln( )ijkct it jt it ct ijkct kc t ijkctq IFRI X X Xα β β β β κχ ε ε ν= + + + + + + + +          (16) 
  1 2 3 4ln( )ijkct it jt it ct ijkct kc t ijkctp IFRI X X Xµ γ γ γ γ κχ ε ε ν= + + + + + + + +         (17) 
where ln( )ijkctp  and ln( )ijkctq  is the natural logarithm of export price and export quality for 
HS6 product k exported by firm j to destination c in industry i respectively. itIFRI  is a measure 
of foreign entry regulation from input sectors. jtX contains a group of firm-level control 
variables, including the import tariff faced by firm j (Ln Import Duty), firm productivity by 
Olley-Pakes (1996) measure (Ln TFP), firm j’s capital intensity (Ln (Capital/Labor)), average 
wage bill per worker (Ln Wage), and firm age (Ln Age). itX  represents foreign entry regulatory 
control for the firm’s own industry. ctX  contains a group of destination-level control variables, 
which includes destination-level real GDP size (Ln real GDP) and real GDP per capita (Ln real 
GDP per capita).6 We also added ijkctχ  for selection correction7 and HS6 product-destination 
fixed effect kcε  as well as year fixed effect tε . According to the theoretical analysis, our focus 
is on the coefficient 1β  and 1γ . Coefficient 1β  in equation (16) corresponds to the equation (13) 
and coefficient 1γ  in equation (17) corresponds to the equation (14). If the empirical results 
show that coefficient 1β  and 1γ  are all significantly negative, the positive effect of FDI 
deregulation on export quality and price as predicted by the theoretical framework could be 
confirmed. 
4.2 Data Sample  
Our main dataset is an unbalanced panel of  Chinese manufacturing firms spanning from 2000 to 
20078. We obtained transaction-level trade data from the Chinese General Administration of  
Customs (GAC). This dataset covers 214 trading partners to China and 8,108 different products 
                                                            
6
 The details of the construction of variables can be seen in appendix E. Summary statistics of variables are 
reported in appendix F. 
7
 The details for how we controlled for selection correction can be found in Appendix D. This approach has been 
documented in Harrigan et al. (2015) and has also been used in Anderson et al. (2019).  
8
 Due to data limitation, we don’t have the custom data before 2000. For the data in year 2000 and 2001, we used 
the regulatory index of 1997.  
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in the 8-digit harmonized system (HS). For each transaction, the data reports the transaction date, 
eight-digit HS product code, trade volume, trade quantities, trading partner, and so on. First, we 
excluded all trading firms. Second, we kept only export information and aggregated the data to 
firm-HS6 product-destination-year level. 9  The second firm-level dataset is the firm-level 
production data from the Annual Surveys of  Industrial Production (ASIP). This dataset reports 
production information for all SOEs and other types with revenues above 5 million yuan (about 
US $800,000). This dataset covers more than 400 four-digit Chinese Industrial Classification 
(CIC) manufacturing industries. We matched the transaction-level data and firm-level production 
data for our analysis10.  
Our data source for the main explanatory variable foreign entry regulation is the 
“Catalogue for the Guidance of  Industries for Foreign Investment”, officially published by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in 1997, 2002, 2004, and 2007. The 
documents cover nearly 400 items spanning all sectors of  the economy. We also used the 
Chinese input-output table from 2002, which contains 122 three-digit industries, to measure the 
extent of  regulation from upstream sectors.  
Furthermore, we used the Chinese tariff  data from the WTO website, which provides HS6 
product-level MFN applied tariff  to construct the firm-level import tariff. In order to construct 
destination-level control variables, we got the country-level real GDP and population data from 
the Penn World Table 9.0. 
4.3 Important Measures 
Measures for Export Price and Quality. We used the export information from GAC to measure 
export price and export quality. The export price is defined as the unit export price value in 
natural logarithm of HS6 product k exported by firm j to destination c in industry i. We followed 
the approach by Fan et al. (2015a, 2015b) and De Loecker et al. (2012) to compute unit value 
export FOB prices by dividing the deflated export value by the physical quantities of exported 
products.  
For the export quality measure, we followed the method from Khandelwal et al. (2013) 
and Fan et al. (2015a; 2015b) to estimate the quality of export products k shipped to country c by 
firm j in year t. We based our estimation of quality on the empirical demand function as:  
                                                            
9
 Our original sample data specifies products at the HS8 level. However, the time span from 2000 to 2007 is 
associated with three product coding adjustments in years 1996, 2002, and 2006. In order to reduce the impact of 
changes in coding, we unified code to HS6 level according to the 2002 version. However, under HS6 there may be 
inconsistency of HS8 level product units. To resolve this problem, we followed Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) and 
deleted those 8-digit HS products that have different units from other products under 6-digit HS classification. 
10
 The details of matching the two dataset can be found in Appendix B.  
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1
ijkct ctctijkct ijkctx q p P Y
η σ σ− −=                            (18) 
Here, jkctx denotes the demand for firm j’s export product k in destination country c in year t. 
ctY  is total income in country c. ctP  refers to destination country c’s price index at time t. Taking 
logs of the above equation, the OLS regression equation is: 
ln( ) ln( )ijkct k ijkct k ct ijkctx pσ α α ε′+ = + +                      (19) 
where product fixed effect kα  captures the difference in price and quantity. Country-year fixed 
effect  captures ctY  and ctP . kσ ′  is the value of the elasticity of substitution. We used the 
estimates of Broda et al. (2006) to allow kσ ′ to vary across the HS2 level. Therefore, the estimated 
export quality is ˆˆln( )ijkct ijkctqη ε= . 
Measure for Foreign Entry Regulation from Input Sectors. First, we constructed a dummy index to 
indicate the foreign entry regulation in every four-digit CIC industry level. Specifically, we matched 
the prohibited or restricted items in the “Catalogue for the Guidance of  Industries for Foreign 
Investment” to the 2002 four-digit CIC industry classification. For every four-digit CIC industry, 
the index=1 if there is prohibited or restricted items under this industry, and the index=0 
otherwise. Then we aggregated the index into three-digit industry level by taking the average. This 
measure is referred to as utDFRI . Finally, we measured the foreign entry regulation from input 
sectors faced by the manufacturing industries. We used the Input-Output matrix linking 
regulation with input sectors to get the indicator:  
it iu ut
u
IFRI DFRIα= ×∑                          (20) 
where itIFRI  is the foreign entry regulation indicator of input sectors in time t for industry i. 
iuα  refers to a weighted input-output relationship between input sector u and industry i. The 
regulatory level faced by industry i is therefore a weighted sum of the regulatory restrictions with 
weights from the input-output table.11 We standardized the foreign entry regulatory index by 
subtracting the mean of the index from the original value and then dividing by its standard 
deviation. We used this standardized index in the subsequent regression analysis. 
5. Baseline results and robustness checks 
                                                            
11
 For a detailed description of how we construct the index, please refer to Appendix C.  
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5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 1 shows the results from baseline regressions in equations (16) and (17). From columns 
(1)-(3), we can see that a decline in foreign entry regulation leads to an increase in export quality. 
The effects are significant at the 1% level. Similarly, columns (4) to (6) show that a decline in 
upstream regulation leads to an increase in export price, with a significance level of 1%. In fact, 
we found evidence that the relaxation of foreign entry regulation helps improve quality and raise 
export prices through input linkage. One standard deviation of decline in regulatory 
restrictiveness from input sectors leads to a 6.4% increase in export product price and a 3.8% 
increase in export product quality according to columns (3) and (6), respectively. 
Table 1 also demonstrates that the decline of import duty leads to a positive and significant 
increase in export price and quality. Columns (3) and (6) reveal the results of the complete 
specification of the baseline regression. Total factor productivity increases can significantly raise 
export price and quality. Increasing the capital labor ratio induces higher export prices and an 
improvement in export quality. Wage increases are also associated with higher export prices and 
quality. Firm age, on the other hand, is negatively associated with export price and quality. 
Meanwhile, relaxation of foreign entry regulatory control at the firm’s own industry has a 
positive impact on export price and quality. The result in Column (3) shows that export quality is 
increased by destination’s real GDP per capita. The selection correction item is positive and 
significant in all columns of Table 1. This means the selection effect does affect the exporter’s 
export quality and pricing decision. 
Table 1: Foreign Entry Regulation, Export Price and Export Quality 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Firm-Product-Destination Quality Firm-Product-Destination Price 
 
ln(Export Quality
fch
) ln(Export Price
fch
) 
IFRI -0.072*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.074*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Import Duty  -0.151*** -0.151***  -0.055*** -0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln TFP  0.068*** 0.068***  0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln (Capital/Labor)  0.117*** 0.117***  0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln Wage  0.570*** 0.570***  0.263*** 0.263*** 
 (0.004) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) 
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Ln Age  -0.033*** -0.033***  -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
DFRI  -0.232*** -0.233***  -0.049*** -0.049*** 
  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln real GDP   -0.028   -0.031 
   (0.064)   (0.026) 
Ln real GDP per capita   0.211***   0.024 
   (0.072)   (0.029) 
Selection Control 0.585*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 
adj. R
2
 0.328 0.326 0.326 0.656 0.664 0.664 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant 
at the 10% level. 
5.2 Extension Results 
 
Manufacturing vs. Service Sector Foreign Entry Deregulation 
As discussed in Section 3, manufacturing sector restrictions are much lighter than services sector 
restrictions. A relevant question to explore is whether relaxing restrictions in the manufacturing 
and services sectors will have the same effect on firms’ export price and quality through input 
linkage, respectively. The results from Table 2 suggest that the marginal effects of relaxing 
foreign entry regulations differ significantly. Columns (1) to (3) show that relaxing foreign entry 
in the manufacturing and services sectors (a decline in the regulatory index) contributes 
positively and significantly to export quality. Moreover, relaxation of the manufacturing 
regulatory control has a larger impact on export quality when compared with the services sector. 
We found similar results in export price. The economic interpretation is that one standard 
deviation of decline in foreign entry regulation in the manufacturing sector is associated with a 
6.7% increase in export price and a 12.8% increase in export quality. Similarly, one standard 
deviation of decline in foreign entry regulation in the services sector is associated with a 2.3% 
increase in export price and a 2.3% increase in export quality according to columns (3) and (6). 
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Table 2 Foreign Entry Deregulation in Upstream Manufacturing Sector and Services Sector 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ln (Export Quality
fhc
) ln(Export Price
fhc
) 
IFRI_Manu -0.066*** -0.127*** -0.128*** -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IFRI_Ser -0.032*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Selection Control 0.588*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm-level and 
Industry-level Control 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Destination-level Control No No Yes No No Yes 
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 
adj. R2 0.325 0.343 0.343 0.656 0.664 0.664 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant 
at the 10% level. 
Imported Inputs and the Impact of Foreign Entry Deregulation 
We further analyzed whether the responses of export price and quality vary by firm according to 
different levels of imported inputs. We introduced an interaction term between import intensity 
and the foreign entry regulation indicator. Import intensity is measured in two ways. First, 
drawing on the approach by Amiti et al. (2014), we defined import intensity as follows: 
Total Import Value of Intermediate Good
Imp Inten=
Total Variable Costs
               (21) 
     Here, total variable costs comprise a firm’s total wage bill and total material costs. 
Considering the possible endogeneity of import intensity, we use firm-level import intensity in 
the initial year, similar to the approach of Yu (2015). Results are reported in Table 3. The results 
reveal that the marginal effect of foreign entry regulation from input sectors still has a positive 
and significant effect on export price and quality. The interaction term between foreign entry 
regulation and imported input intensity is negative and significant. The larger the imported 
inputs, the higher the effects of changing foreign entry regulation on export price and quality. 
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This suggests that firms with higher imported input intensity are more sensitive to the changes in 
foreign entry regulation. 
Table 3 The Role of  Imported Inputs: Import Input Intensity 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ln (Export Quality
fhc
) ln(Export Price
fhc
) 
IFRI -0.066*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.072*** -0.062*** -0.062*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
IFRI ×Imp Inten -0.155*** -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.046*** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Imp Inten 0.274*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.108*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Selection Control 0.585*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm-level and 
Industry-level Control 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Destination-level Control No No Yes No No Yes 
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 
adj. R
2
 0.328 0.326 0.326 0.656 0.664 0.664 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant 
at the 10% level. 
Aside from using a direct measure for imported input intensity, we also measured the extent 
of imported inputs by their geographical location. Many Chinese firms tend to import more 
inputs if they are located in an export processing zone. Firms tend to have lower fixed costs 
related to importing inputs in those zones when compared with those in other areas. The results 
reported in Table G.1. in Appendix G reveal that the interaction term between the foreign entry 
regulatory index and the area code dummy is negative and significant. The marginal effects of 
relaxing the foreign entry regulation are higher for firms located in the export processing zone. 
These results are consistent with Table 3. 
5.3 Robustness Check  
Endogeneity Problem 
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Changes in the regulation of foreign entry are not made in a vacuum. Instead, the Chinese 
government takes a significant number of factors into consideration when deciding which 
sectors are to be encouraged and which are to be restricted. It is possible that the Chinese 
government formulates its foreign entry policies based on the developmental stage of the overall 
economy and industry performance. The government may also use these policies to regulate 
particular segments of the economy and achieve better export performance, such as quality 
upgrading. Therefore, the policy change may be endogenous. In particular, relaxation of foreign 
entry policies may be extended to industries where important input is needed to upgrade quality. 
As a result, there may be reverse causality.  
To address this problem, we adopted the approach by Beverelli et al. (2017). They proposed 
an instrumental variable approach that exploits information on related policy adopted by other 
countries. We used this approach to construct the instrumental variable for our foreign entry 
restrictions. Firstly, we used the other countries’ FDI regulatory restrictiveness data at the 
industry level from the OECD STAN database to calculate a weighted average of FDI regulatory 
restrictiveness in other countries: 
IV
cut ctut
c
DFRI DFRI SI≡ ×∑                         (22) 
where
2 2
1
t ct
ct
t ct t ct
pcGDP pcGDP
SI
pcGDP pcGDP pcGDP pcGDP
   
≡ − −   
+ +   
. tpcGDP  is GDP per capita 
of China in year t and ctpcGDP  is GDP per capita of country c in year t. So ctSI  measures the 
similarity in GDP per capita between China and country c. As mentioned in Beverelli et al. 
(2017), countries with a similar level of GDP per capita tend to have similar forces shaping the 
political economy of policies. IVutDFRI  corresponds to utDFRI  in Equation (20). Thus, the 
instrumental variable is defined as: 
IV IV
iu utit
u
IFRI DFRIα≡ ×∑                         (23) 
Equation (23) corresponds to Equation (20), and IVitIFRI  is the instrumental variable for
itIFRI . The results of the IV approach are presented in Table 4. It shows that, when controlling 
for the possible endogeneity of the key explanatory variable, relaxing foreign entry regulation (a 
decline in the index) can increase export price and improve export quality through input linkage.  
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Table 4 Endogenous Policy Change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ln (Export Qualityfhc) ln(Export Pricefhc) 
IFRI -0.134*** -0.085** -0.084** -0.088*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
 
(0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Selection Control 0.585*** 0.584*** 0.584*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm-level and 
Industry-level Control 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Destination-level Control No No Yes No No Yes 
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 
K-P rk LM 5388.70*** 4677.64*** 4688.66*** 5388.70*** 4677.64*** 4688.66*** 
K-P Wald 4827.90*** 4539.97*** 4552.50*** 4827.90*** 4539.97*** 4552.50*** 
First stage for IV 2.238*** 2.122*** 2.123*** 2.238*** 2.122*** 2.123*** 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant 
at the 10% level. 
 
Alternative Measure of Foreign Entry Regulation 
To test the robustness of our key measure for foreign entry regulation, we used an alternative 
index, the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index,12 to re-estimate the relationship between foreign 
entry deregulation and export price and quality through input linkage. The results in Table 5 are 
consistent with the baseline regression with coefficients on the OECD Index to be negative and 
significant. They suggest that a less restrictive policy environment induces firms to raise export 
prices and upgrade quality.  
 
 
 
                                                            
12
 Data are from the OECD FDI Restrictiveness Index. We used input and output tables for the weights used to 
calculate a restrictiveness index on the upstream sectors.  
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Table 5 Alternative Index of Foreign Entry Regulation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
ln (Export Quality
fhc
) ln(Export Price
fhc
) 
OECD Index -0.160*** -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Selection Control 0.583*** 0.583*** 0.583*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm-level and 
Industry-level Control 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Destination-level Control No No Yes No No Yes 
Product-Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 2250850 
adj. R
2
 0.331 0.328 0.328 0.655 0.664 0.664 
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant 
at the 10% level. 
In addition to the above analysis, we have also performed further robustness checks. The 
results in general confirm with the baseline results. They can be found in Appendix G.2.  
6. Conclusion 
Since the last few decades, foreign entry deregulation has become one of the important reforms 
both in developed and developing countries. What such policy reform brings to the economic 
development is an intriguing question. Given that the input-output structure has become a main 
characteristic of economic development, this paper contributes to the literature by examining the 
impact of upstream foreign entry deregulation on the export price and quality of downstream 
firms in the case of China. 
For manufacturing firms, reduction in the foreign entry regulation for input sectors could 
lead to the expansion of intermediate goods variety and the reduction of their price. This is 
because relaxation of foreign regulatory control allows more foreign controlled firms to enter 
into the intermediate goods market and apply advanced technologies in the production of inputs. 
When foreign entry regulatory control relaxes, fixed costs and the marginal cost of production 
reduce. More kinds of intermediate goods would be produced and sold at lower price level. As a 
result, foreign entry deregulation leads to a reduction in the cost of improving export quality for 
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the manufacturing firms. Higher quality products increase the export demand, leading to higher 
prices.  
To perform the empirical analysis, we extracted policy information from various revisions 
of the “Catalogue for the Guidance of Industries for Foreign Investment” during the years 
spanning the period from 1997 to 2007. In doing so, we formed a unique dataset describing the 
extent of regulatory control on foreign entry across approximately 900 four-digit CIC industries 
covering all manufacturing and services sectors. Moreover, instead of estimating the direct 
impact of policy change, we examined inter-sectoral linkages. We measured the foreign entry 
regulation index by weighting the above dataset by the intensity of intermediate input use in 
China. This enabled us to estimate the indirect effects of foreign entry regulatory changes on 
firms’ export performance and to empirically test the changes in foreign entry regulation on 
downstream firms’ export quality and export price decision.  
We obtained three main results. First, foreign entry deregulation in intermediate markets 
induces downstream firms to produce higher quality products and set higher export prices. 
Second, the effect of foreign entry deregulation in upstream manufacturing sectors is much 
stronger than the effect of foreign entry deregulation in upstream services sectors. Third, firm 
imported input intensity has an important influence on the positive effect of foreign entry 
deregulation in the intermediate market. This implies that foreign entry deregulation is more 
likely to raise export quality and price in firms with larger imported input intensity. These results 
are robust under a number of alternative specifications. Using other countries’ FDI regulation as 
an instrument to control for the possible endogeneity arising from reverse causality, we found 
that the impact of upstream foreign entry deregulation is still positively related to downstream 
firms’ export quality and export price.  
Our results have profound implications for FDI policies. The positive link between 
upstream foreign entry deregulation and downstream firms’ export quality and price supports the 
ongoing reforms of FDI regulation. Relaxing FDI restrictions not only has direct benefits to a 
firm’s cost savings and quality improvement, but also provides greater incentives for downstream 
firms to upgrade quality. The indirect impacts, which tend to be overlooked, may be significant, 
as firms are increasingly linked with each other through input-output linkage.  
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